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Abstract—One of the most promising application areas of
the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is Vehicular Ad hoc
NETworks (VANETs). VANETs are largely used by Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS) to provide smart and safe road
transport. To reduce the network burden, Software Defined
Networks (SDNs) acts as a remote controller. Motivated by
the need for greener IIoT solutions, this paper proposes an
energy-efficient end-to-end security solution for Software Defined
Vehicular Networks (SDVN). Besides SDN’s flexible network
management, network performance, and energy-efficient end-to-
end security scheme plays a significant role in providing green
IIoT services. Thus, the proposed SDVN provides lightweight
end-to-end security. The end-to-end security objective is handled
in two levels: i) In RSU-based Group Authentication (RGA)
scheme, each vehicle in the RSU range receives a group id-key
pair for secure communication and ii) In private-Collaborative
Intrusion Detection System (p-CIDS), SDVN detects the potential
intrusions inside the VANET architecture using collaborative
learning that guarantees privacy through a fusion of differential
privacy and homomorphic encryption schemes. The SDVN is
simulated in NS2 & MATLAB, and results show increased energy
efficiency with lower communication and storage overhead than
existing frameworks. In addition, the p-CIDS detects the intruder
with an accuracy of 96.81% in the SDVN.
Index Terms—Green IIoT, Vehicular Ad hoc NETworks, Soft-
ware Defined Networks, Energy Efficiency, Group Authentica-
tion, Differential Privacy, Homomorphic Encryption
I. INTRODUCTION
The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is a new ecosystem
that combines intelligence fetched from the Internet of Things
(IoT) devices to improve performance. One of the key appli-
cation areas of IIoT is the Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS) that relies on Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) for
improved road safety and driving assistance to their IoT users
[1]. The adoption of VANET in ITS technologies will reduce
the number of accidents to 1 million per year by 2020, with
an economic benefit of $25.6 billion per year [2]. With an
increased demand for ITS, the CO2 footprint also increases.
Current research focuses on green IoT, where energy-saving
solutions are at the core of the design and development of the
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system. Thus, ITS requires integrated energy-efficient security
features suited to its dynamic nature [3], [4].
Software Defined Network (SDN) is a fast-growing net-
working paradigm that allows flexibility and network config-
uration by separating data and control planes [5], [6]. The
SDN based VANET architecture consists of vehicles with On-
Board Unit (OBU), and RoadSide Unit (RSU). The RSUs are
connected to the SDN controller and act as switches to obtain
global network information. The SDN in VANET provides the
following advantages: i) simplifies network management and
ensures VANET elasticity [7], ii) global network knowledge
from RSUs avoids periodic beacon messages among them.
As a result, the network burden is substantially reduced and
provides efficient routing decisions [8]. SDN integrated with
Edge or Fog computing leverage the potential of pervasive
technologies to provide several vehicular services such as
location-based services, content sharing services, and so on.
Besides SDN’s flexible network management, it is also
essential to secure the vehicular network. A secure VANET
encourages the participants to take part in it. Moreover,
security in VANETs is of particular concern as human lives are
frequently at risk [9]. Authentication acts as a primary defense
mechanism to guarantee that a received message originates
from an authenticated source [10]. Furthermore, the RSUs
are capable of authenticating the vehicles in its range on
the fly [11]. Still, VANETs are vulnerable to many kinds
of attacks by a malicious insider node [12]. Some rogue
vehicles after authentication pose as legitimate VANET users
and send messages to interrupt the network communication.
Thus, VANETs need reactive mechanisms such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) in addition to the authentication
mechanism to detect potential intruders [13]. Typically, a cen-
tralized IDS analyzes a dataset present in a central database,
to search for an intrusion-related pattern. But such IDS are
susceptible to performance bottlenecks, single-point failure,
scalability issues, and often prone to data privacy risk [14].
To overcome the challenges faced by centralized IDS and
to improve the classifier performance, a collaborative IDS is
suitable for a dynamic network like VANETs.
Our contributions to the aforesaid problems in VANET are:
• In the proposed RSU-based Group Authentication (RGA)
technique, the RSU provides a group ID and group key
pair for each vehicle in its range to ensure further secure
communication among vehicles with reduced network
overhead.
• A private-Collaborative IDS (p-CIDS) is proposed to de-
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tect potential attacks using a Collaborative Learning (CL)
model. The p-CIDS in each vehicle learns collaboratively
by co-ordinating with other vehicles.
The rest of this paper is structured, as section II discusses
the literature related to VANET security solutions. The SDVN
framework overview and its preliminaries are presented in
section III. In section IV, the RGA mechanism is discussed.
The p-CIDS based on CL is detailed in Section V. Section VI
discusses the empirical findings and presents them in detail.
Finally, the work is concluded in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Numerous works study the importance of authentication in
networking technologies such as LTE [15], VANETs [16],
and so on. Threshold-based authentication [17] and Bilinear
Pairing (BP) scheme [9] achieves anonymity, unforgeability,
and revokes malicious node via traceability. A BP scheme and
several trusted authorities were used to have a decentralized
system [18]. Because of BP cryptography, the computational
overhead is increased. In [16], securing group communication
for SDN based 5G-VANET environment is focused but failed
to support scalability. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-
based authentication, and Fuzzy C-means clustering for intru-
sion detection is used to prevent and detect the intruders in the
network, respectively [19]. In [1], the El-Gamal signature is
used, but such researchers face difficulty in cluster formation
and inter-cluster communication.
There are a lot of recent research findings for the IDS
system as security solutions in VANET. For example, the
system in [13] uses a novel feature extraction technique, and
the classification algorithm is based on improved growing hi-
erarchical self-organizing map. A hierarchical growing neural
gas network-based IDS is proposed in [12] that uses a semi-
cooperative feature extraction algorithm, where the current
location information is acquired from the neighboring vehicles
in a co-operative fashion.
To secure the data and operate on ciphertext space, a
homomorphic encryption method is discussed in [20]. Privacy
preservation in Machine Learning (ML) is addressed using
a differential privacy paradigm, which deals with adding
a statistically-designed noise to the exchanged functions or
states to protect the sensitive data [21]. Alternatively, in [22],
a cryptographic image classification algorithm is proposed
on a multi-layer extreme learning system that is capable of
specifically classifying encrypted images without decryption.
The proposed SDVN provides energy-efficient authentica-
tion mechanisms and intrusion detection that makes the system
more secure and robust against VANET cyber-security attacks.
III. SDVN FRAMEWORK
Software Defined Vehicular Network (SDVN) framework
provides end-to-end security and privacy using both proac-
tive and reactive mechanisms in an energy-efficient manner.
For proactive security, RGA authentication is designed as
a lightweight authentication mechanism with reduced com-
munication costs. The reactive security, p-CIDS, is a CIDS
Fig. 1. System model of SDVN
system that uses Collaborative Learning (CL), which reduces
the storage cost of the CIDS.
The SDVN framework uses distributed SDN controllers
with flat network topology, in which each of them is respon-
sible for a specific segment such as the city. As shown in
Fig. 1, the data plane constituted by the RSUs and BS is con-
nected to the SDN controller and facilitates it with the global
network information. The control plane provides policies like
mobility management, authentication, routing, and so on. The
flat design of the controllers enables them not only with a
local and global view of the network but also reduces the
complexity of the computation. The reliability of VANET can
be achieved through the integration of security features into
SDVN. The RGA scheme increases the trustworthiness of the
network by ensuring messages received from an authenticated
source. However, a semi-honest vehicle can perform malicious
activities, which can be detected using CL based p-CIDS
present in each vehicle.
The SDVN security architecture consists of Certificate Au-
thority (CA), and VANET nodes (RSU & vehicles).
1) Certificate Authority: CA registers VANET nodes, stores
identities, issues private credentials, and also capable enough
to revoke certificates. CA is a fully trusted entity by VANET
nodes and is interfaced with the control layer of the SDN
controller. In the practical scenario, there will be ‘n’ number
of CA available and each responsible for one particular region.
Each VANET node should register exactly with one CA.
2) RoadSide Unit: RSU is a fixed infrastructure component
in SDVN that is connected to the SDN controller. The con-
troller is aware of interconnection among RSUs and transfers
the logic to RSU for executing control layer commands. The
security model is modeled as hierarchical trust, in which CA
acts as a fully trusted entity, and RSUs act as the next level
of trust. RSUs support and act as the upper level of trust for
the vehicles in the network. The CA revokes the certificate of
compromised RSUs to maintain trust.
3) Vehicles: Each vehicle is equipped with sensors and
Tamper-Proof Devices (TPD). The TPD is capable of storing
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cryptographic material generated by CA or RSU. Each vehicle
in SDVN is registered with the CA before it joins the VANET.
After successful registration, CA generates private credentials
along with certificates, which are issued to each vehicle user
in the network. The exchanged message format for V2V
communication includes vital elements such as group id,
pseudo id, payload, timestamp, and payload hash to achieve
the integrity of the message.
In SDVN, vehicles engage in an authentication process,
and if successful, it receives the group id-key pair for further
network communication. Due to ECC-based cryptography, the
attacker can’t retrieve the secret key from the public key.
To achieve message integrity, SDVN also uses key hashed
functions. However, even after authentication, a vehicle can
become semi-honest to the network through malicious activi-
ties like spreading misinformation. In such cases, the malicious
activity is identified using p-CIDS and shared with the CA,
which further revokes the credentials of the adversary. Thus,
the SDVN framework prohibits the participation of malicious
vehicles, thereby providing end-to-end security.
IV. RGA: RSU-BASED GROUP AUTHENTICATION
The source authentication by RGA act as a first-level
defense mechanism in VANET. The SDN controller in SDVN
runs the authentication module and responsible for controlling
the network. The control plane provides general policies for
authentication, mobility management, and routing. The CA
provide the key for its registered users, deployed RSUs, and
also capable of revoking the malicious node. In traditional,
revoked identity is stored in the revocation list, which con-
sumes storage space and increased searching time. To reduce
the storage space and the searching time, CA constructs the
Id revocation polynomial (Ai
′
i ) and key revocation polynomial
(Ki
′
i ) using the identities and secret key of revoked vehicles in
the SDVN network respectively. Besides, the proposed RGA
process uses ECC-based authentication mechanism because of
its fast computation and robustness to attacks. It achieves mu-
tual authentication and confidentiality between the participants
and also resists a reply attack.
A. RGA System Initialization
Let Fp be a finite field where p denotes the large prime
number and the elliptic curve defined as E : y2 = x3 + ax+
b mod p, a, b ∈ Z∗q . The CA in SDVN selects the group
G on E, where the order of the group as q and generator
as g. CA construct the function f(x, y) = b0x + b1y + c,
where b0, b1, c ∈ Z∗q are constants. After initializing these
system parameters, CA generates public-private credentials for
all the network entities. First, CA generates its public and
private key based on these system parameters and performs
ECC multiplication on a chosen random number. A similar
procedure gets repeated to generate public and private keys for
each network node, and also they get the unique Id. The private
and public keys, as well as unique Id securely shared with
their corresponding entities. Each node in the SDVN network
is capable of holding TPD to store the details like private key,
unique Id, etc.
Algorithm 1 RGA System Initialization Process
Input: Order of elliptic curve n, V IDi, RIDi
Output: Nodes’ public-private key pairs, RSUs’ member key
1: Set the public parameters p, a, b and g
2: Generate CA public and private key K = k.g
3: for all vehicles and RSUs do
4: Allocate unique Id for vehicle as V Idi, RSU as RIdi
5: Generate vehicle pseudo Id as h(V Idi||k||nj), j = 1, 2
6: Generate secret key for vehicle (SVi) & RSUs (SRi)
7: Compute public keys PVi = SVi.g and PRi = SRi.g
8: end for
9: Generate the member key for RSUs (MR)
10: Compute the public key MP = MR.g
In Algorithm 1, step 2 specifies the key generation for
CA, and from step 4 to 7, CA generates the key pairs for
vehicles and RSUs. The unique Id is obtained by hashing
the corresponding id with the private key of the CA as
V Idn = h(V IDi||k) and RIdi = h(RIDi||k) for vehicles
and RSUs respectively. Step 9 and 10, specifies the member
key generation for RSUs in the VANET to perform commu-
nication among them.
RSU Initialization: The RSUs in the SDVN network re-
ceives its own public and private credentials and stores it in
TPD. To initialize the RGA scheme, RSU computes the unique
group id using its private key GIdj = h(RIdj ||SRj ||r)
where r ∈ Z∗q . In addition, RSU selects the random number
d1, t1 ∈ Z∗q and computes the backward hash chain of length
n, as tn−1 = h(t1), tn = h(tn−1), and dn−1 = h(d1), dn =
h(dn−1), where n = 3. To have secure communication
among authenticated vehicles, each RSU in the SDVN network
computes its own group key as GKj = h(d1, tn). CA
generated Id revocation polynomial Ai
′
i (x) = (x−V Id1)(x−
V Id2)...(x − V Idk), where V Id1, V Id2, ..., V Idk are the
identities of revoked vehicles. This revocation polynomial gets
shared with all RSUs in the SDVN network to reject malicious
vehicle at the time of authentication process.
B. RGA Authentication Process for Secure Communication
The vehicles in the SDVN network initiates the authentica-
tion process to get the group id and group key from the nearby
RSU. With the help of group id-key pair, the vehicles ensure
the authenticity of the received message. The detailed process
of the proposed RGA mechanism is shown in Fig. 2.
Step 1: The vehicle Vi initiates the RGA authentication
process by sending its V Idi and Loci to the nearby RSUj .
Step 2: The RSUj checks the Id revocation polynomial,
if vehicle id is revoked then Ai
′
i (x) = 0 and also checks the
location is within the range, then generates the random number
(R1) by performing ECC multiplication on random number
(r1) and time stamp (TSj), else tears down the connection.
If valid, then R1 and TSj is relayed to Vi.
Step 3: The Vi which received the time-stamp TSj checks
the validity of time falls within the permissible range, further
communication gets established, otherwise cut down the con-
nection. The Vi computes the temporary token T1 = h(V Idi),
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Fig. 2. RGA authentication process between RSU and vehicles
T2 = h(R1.SVi) and generate the time stamp TSi, authentica-
tion token Ai = h(T1||T2||TSi) as well as the random number
(R2). The Authentication token Ai, R2 and TSi gets relayed
to RSUj .
Step 4: The RSUj checks the validity of time, if valid ac-
cepts the message otherwise breaks the connection. The RSUj
computes the token T3 = h(V Idi), T4 = h(r1.PVi) and
A
′
i = h(T3||T4||TSi). If the equivalence of Ai and A
′
i is true,
proceed; otherwise break the connection. The RSUj computes
the temporary token T5 = h(R2.SRj), generate the time
stamp TSj and Authentication token Aj = h(T3||T5||TSj).
The RSUj computes the session key using the public key of
the vehicle and private key of the RSU SKi,j = PVi.SRj .
Then encrypts the group id and elements of group key pair
(d1, tn) using session key (SKi,j), which makes the shared
information secure and confidential. The Authentication token
Aj , TSj and encrypted message gets relayed to Vi.
Step 5: The Vi checks the validity of time, if valid accepts
the message otherwise breaks the connection. The Vi computes
the token T6 = h(r2.PRj) and A
′
j = h(T1||T6||TSj). If the
equivalence of Aj and A
′
j is true, then proceed; otherwise
break the connection. After mutual authentication, Vi decrypts
the message which consists of the group id and elements of
group key of RSUj using session key SKi,j = SVi.PRj . The
vehicle computes the group key of RSUj as GKj = h(d1, tn)
and stores it in TPD.
The authenticated vehicles have the group id and group key
to perform further V2V communication in the SDVN network.
The V2V communication uses group id (GIdj), group key
(GKj) as follows: the vehicles send the message with group
id GIdj , pseudo id PIdi, Message M , and hash the message
using group key h(M), the received vehicle checks the GIdj
and if it is valid accept the message otherwise rejects the





(M), which ensures that received message
is not modified by others. Further, confidentiality is achieved
by encrypting the message, which consists of PIdi,M , and
h(M), using the group key. If malicious activity found, the
report is sent to nearby RSU along with the PIdi and GIdj .
The CA has the ability to open the true vehicle id and punish
the node by invalidating the certificate. The CA includes the
misbehaved vehicle id and secret key into the Id revocation
polynomial and key revocation polynomial, respectively. Then
sends the updated Id revocation polynomial to all RSUs and
key revocation polynomial to reported group id of RSU. The
reported RSU in SDVN creates new group id-key pair and
also updates its previous group key to protect the group from a
rogue vehicle. The following subsection describes the previous
group key update process of RGA.
C. RGA Group Key Update Process
The RSUs of SDVN network receives the key revocation
polynomial Ki
′
i (x) from CA initializes the RGA group key
update process, where Ki
′
i (x) = (x − SV1)(x − SV2)...(x −
SVk), where SV1, SV2, ..., SVk are the secret key of re-
voked vehicles. Assume RSUj receives the key revocation
polynomial, then it computes the updated group key as
GKj = h(d2, t2) and a masking polynomial ϕ(x, y) =
Ki
′
i (x).tn−1 + dn−1.f(x, y). The RSUj sends the reported
group id, key revocation and masking polynomial to the
base station in the SDVN network, which further broad-
cast the received message to the vehicles in its range. The
vehicle which receives the message checks the group id,
if it valid then it under goes the group key update pro-
cess. The vehicle Vi updates it key by computing dn−1 =
h(d1),K
i′






. The vehicle also
verifies the tn = h(tn−1), if it is valid then vehicle Vi
computes the updated group key as GKj = h(dn−1, tn−1). If
the vehicle is revoked, Ki
′
i (SVi) = 0, and the rogue vehicle
cannot get the updated key.
V. PRIVATE-COLLABORATIVE IDS (P-CIDS)
The RGA authentication process prevents the outside at-
tackers, but some rouge users perform attack after joining
the SDVN network. To detect such intruders in the dynamic
VANET environment, p-CIDS is developed, as shown in Fig.
1. In p-CIDS, the vehicles share their knowledge to its nearby
users with the help of Distributed Machine Learning (DML)
techniques. When vehicles collaborate, DML’s model param-
eters are shared to generate the global model. The designed
CIDS works collaboratively to detect attacks in the VANET
environment, such as sybil attack, wormhole, blackhole, denial
of service attacks, and so on.
For DML, each vehicle in SDVN has a partitioned dataset
and performs the ML steps to obtain their loss function.
The global model is obtained by minimizing the sum of loss
function of all the vehicles in the SDVN network. Alternating
Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) is used for CL, as
ADMM convergence is more rapid with a standard conver-
gence rate of O(1/t) [23], [24].
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A. ADMM based Collaborative Learning Problem
Let us consider a VANET network, which consists of N
vehicles which can be represented as a undirected Graph
G(N,E). N = {1, 2, 3, ...,N} represents the number of
vehicles in the VANET and E represents the set of edges
connecting the vehicles. A vehicle m ∈ N can exchange
information only with its neighbour i ∈ Nm, where Nm
is the set of neighbouring vehicles to vehicle m and Nl
is the total number of neighbouring vehicles to vehicle m.
Each vehicle m contains a dataset Dm = {(xjm, yjm) ⊂
X × Y : j = 0, 1, ..., Rm}, in which Rm is the training
data size containing data instances xjm ∈ X ⊆ Rd, where
d refers to dimensional vector space of the instances and
corresponding label yjm = {0, 1}. The total dataset of the
entire network is thus, D̂ = ∪l∈NDm. Let us consider the
Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) problem for a regularized
binary classification as follows:
min
fm

















Here C ≤ Rm and τ are constants; C is called regularization
parameter, τ controls the effect of regularization. The Loss
function L (.) is a measure of the classifier accuracy. The
function R(.) assists in mitigating the over-fitting problem.
Thus the goal is to learn a global classifier fm over the total
training dataset D̂ in a distributed fashion using a ADMM and
also provides privacy assurance to each data sample.
To apply ADMM-based distributed learning algorithm, the
objective function is reformulated to be solved for collabo-
rative nodes and solved using ADMM using the following
equations [25]:
fm(t+ 1) = arg min
fm






‖(fm(t) + fi(t))− fm‖2}
(2)





(fm(t+ 1)− fi(t+ 1)) (3)
where fm and λm are called global classifier and dual variable
of the ADMM algorithm, respectively. Each vehicle in the
SDVN network runs the CL algorithm to detect the intruders.
The IDS in each vehicle uses a pre-processed dataset and runs
the CL algorithm, which minimizes the loss function of fm.
If neighbor available in its coverage, then it broadcast the
fm. Each vehicle that receives fm undergoes the operation in
Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) to compute the global classifier model by
iterating for a particular threshold of iterations (50 iterations).
The updated classifier fm is used to predict the future traffic
data instances in the SDVN network.
B. Secure and Private Collaborative Learning
The CL methodology results in a scalable IDS for the
SDVN, which best suits the dynamic VANET system. The
CL is secure than centralized learning as training data is not
shared directly, but the classifier only is shared. CL is energy-
efficient than centralized learning because of the reduced
Algorithm 2 Secure and Private Collaborative Learning
Initial Stage: Each vehicle has f0j , λ0j = 0, j ∈ N
Input:: Network traffic data Output: updated classifier
1: if traffic data received then
2: Pre-process (Collected traffic data)
3: for t = 0, 1, 2..., Th do
4: for m = 1, 2, ..., N do
5: Compute the classifier fm(t+ 1) using Eq. (2)
6: Vehicle m encrypts f t+1m with member public key
Mrp and adds laplacian noise e:
f t+1m → E(−f t+1m ) + E(e)
7: Vehicle m broadcasts f t+1m to its neighbor i




12: The classifier fm is sent to RSU
13: At RSU, decrypt the classifier and send the classifier to
the vehicle
storage overhead and computational efficiency. Yet this private
solution results in privacy leakage if an adversary can gather
information through statistical inferences of the data. Simple
anonymization techniques are not sufficient to provide a barrier
against such privacy leakages. It is, therefore, becomes a need
to protect the SDVN system from such privacy leakages. We
formally describe our Secure and Private CL (SPCL) with the
notion of differential privacy and homomorphic cryptosystem
as a means of guaranteeing privacy against inference attacks.
The p-CIDS unit in each vehicle has the following compo-
nents: communication agent, analysis unit, Global Learning
Unit (GLU), security and privacy manager. The analysis unit
consists of pre-processing unit and Local Monitoring Unit
(LMU). The security and privacy manager consists of Dif-
ferential Privacy (DP) and Homomorphic Cryptosystem (HC).
Each vehicle monitors the network traffic and application
traces in the vehicle using LMU, which consists of a classifier.
The LMU will generate an alert if the classifier indicates
an intrusion. The classifier in the LMU can be updated
using CL in GLU. Once initialized, the GLU runs the SPCL
algorithm and updates the current classifier in LMU. The
SPCL algorithm uses DP and HC components of the security
and privacy manager for securing the training data used in
the CL. Any communication for CL uses the communication
agent of the IDS.
1) Homomorphic Cryptosystem: If a system uses a separate
key for encryption and decryption, then it is called a public
key cryptosystem. In SDVN, public key (PHk) is used for
encryption and a secret key (SHk) is used for decryption
process [20].
Definition 1: Homomorphic Cryptosystem
A public key cryptosystem (Gen, Enc, Dec) is known as
homomorphic if for all message x in plain text space P with
encryption/decryption key pair (PHk, SHk), it is possible to
define groups P, C such that:
(i) The message in plain text space P, and all ciphertexts
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output by encryption algorithm are elements of cipher text
space C.
(ii) For any p1, p2 ∈ P and their corresponding cipher
texts c1,c2 ∈ C, it should satisfy the following criteria:
DecSHk(c1.c2) = p1 + p2.
The multiplication of cipher text (c1, c2) is equivalent to
the cipher text obtained by encrypting sum of p1 and p2.
2) Differential Privacy:
Definition 2: Neighboring Dataset
The datasets D and D′ have the same symmetry and
attribute structure, which is denoted as | D ∆ D′|. We call D
and D′ neighbour datasets if and only if: | D ∆ D′| = 1.
Definition 3: ε-Differential Privacy
A randomized mechanism S gives ε-DP for every set of
outputs X , and for any neighbor data set of D and D′, if S
satisfies the following condition: Pr[S(D) ∈ X] ≤ exp(ε) ×
Pr[S(D′) ∈ X].
Definition 4: Laplace - Differential Privacy Mechanism
For a dataset D and a function f : X → Y , a privacy
mechanism M(D) = f(D) + e provides ε−DP where e ∈
R has Lap(σ) distribution, if its density function is given by
1
2σ exp(−|x|/σ).
The CL algorithm requires the vehicles to collaborate and
disclose intermediate classifiers in each iteration with the
neighboring vehicles to reach an agreement on an optimal
final classifier. The security and privacy manager provides
DP and HC functions to provide privacy preservation to the
CL of the CIDS used in the SDVN. SPCL is based on a
paillier homomorphic cryptosystem [20], which is public key
cryptography with a pair of keys, namely public key and
private key. The reliability of these systems is bound to the
hardness of solving the factorization problem.
The privacy preservation mechanism is applied to CL using
a combination of DP and HC, as shown in Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 2, the broadcast classifier is encrypted before
sending it to other vehicles with encryption function E(.).
A laplacian noise is added to the encrypted classifier and
broadcasted to neighboring vehicle i. Thus, CL happens in
the ciphertext space and also perturbed using a laplacian
noise to apply the DP paradigm. At any vehicle i, the dual
variable λm(t+1) is calculated from Eq. (3) from the received
classifier. Once the number of iterations reaches its threshold,
the classifier is sent to RSU of SDVN network, which decrypts
the model and sends it back to each vehicle. The LMU uses
the received classifier for future predictions.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS
The proposed mechanisms are simulated in NS2 and MAT-
LAB on a four-core 3.2 GHZ machine with an 8 GB RAM. For
the experimental analysis of p-CIDS, the NSL-KDD dataset
is used [26]. In this section, we present the experimental
analysis of the authentication mechanism, security, and privacy
of training data in collaborative IDS.
A. Security and overhead analysis of RGA
In this subsection, we highlight the Security Features (SF) of
the RGA mechanism in the SDVN framework towards VANET
cyber-security attacks.
TABLE I
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SECURITY FEATURES
Scheme SF1 SF2 SF3 SF4 SF5 SF6 SF7 SF8
Zhong et al [9] × X X X × X X ×
Azees et al [18] × X X × X X X X
Dua et al [1] X × X X × X X X
Sahil et al [19] X X X X X × × X
RGA scheme X X X X X X X X
1) Support mutual authentication (SF1): In the RGA
method, authentication occurs between vehicles and RSU,
ensures the authenticity of participating vehicles by means
of the authentication token. To create the token, ECC mul-
tiplication is performed on random number with the private
key, thereby ensuring that only authenticated vehicles have a
genuine private key. In ECC, extracting the private key from
public key is impossible.
2) Resist eavesdropping (SF2): The use of the random
number, timestamps, and private key in the authentication
process avoids eavesdropping attacks in VANET. The attacker
can’t extract exchanged messages because of the above at-
tributes as well as group id and key pair, which is encrypted
using the shared key.
3) Support anonymity (SF3): Anonymity accomplished
through fresh tokens during the authentication process. In each
run between RSU and vehicles, a fresh token is generated by
means of a random number, time stamp, location, and ECC-
based private key.
4) Resist replay attack (SF4): The timestamp attribute in
the authentication process resists the VANET replay attack.
The participating nodes in the SDVN network drop the delayed
transmitted messages. The replay attack is avoided because of
a random number in the authentication token for each run.
5) Resist spoofing attack (SF5): The attacker cannot spoof
the identity of CA, RSU, and vehicles in the VANET because
the token is generated by the private key of the nodes. Under
the ECC cryptosystem, it is impossible to find a private key
from a public key.
6) Support message authentication (SF6): After authenti-
cation, group id and key pair have been used to indicate the
authenticity of the message. The vehicle checks the group id
and integrity of the message using the group key. The revoked
vehicles can’t get this pair to participate in the SDVN network.
7) Resist man-in-the-middle attack (SF7): The authenti-
cation token created by the respective private and public
credentials of the participants in the authentication process.
The group id-key pair gets encrypted using the session key
their genuine participants generate. The intermediate nodes,
therefore, can not be able to forge them.
8) Support forward secrecy (SF8): The RGA authentication
and group update process support forward secrecy, which uses
a random number, and timestamp attribute to enhance the
security of the SDVN framework. The attacker cannot retrieve
the previously exchanged messages, even though they aware
of the current system information. Table I summarizes the
comparative analysis of the security features provided by the
proposed RGA system with the current state-of-the-art VANET
security mechanism. From Table I, it is inferred that the RGA
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TABLE II








Zhong et al [9] 823∗, 832n∗∗ 0.0171n +
0.1197∗∗
1




Dua et al [1] 2144 0.1406 3
Sahil et al [19] 1568 0.1061 4
RGA scheme 1632 0.117 4
where *: single message verification, **: batch verification of messages,
!:single certificate and signature, !!: n certificate and signature.
scheme performs better in terms of resistance to cyber-security
attacks and also provides supportive security features.
B. Comparative analysis
In this subsection, the cost of computing and transmitting
the RGA scheme is compared with other schemes in the
authentication process of VANET. Vehicle registration is a
one-time operation in the RGA scheme, and thus, the cost
of authentication between vehicles and RSU is considered.
The RGA process takes advantage of ECC cryptography and
a one-way hash function. Our scheme uses 160-bit ECC, which
is equal to a 1024-bit RSA cryptosystem and 160-bit output
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1).
1) Comuptation cost: The computation time in seconds for
160-bit ECC multiplication (Teccm), one-way hash function
(Th), and symmetric encryption (Tsenc) or decryption (Tsdec)
is 0.0171, 0.00032, and 0.0056 respectively. The RGA authen-
tication process between vehicles and RSU requires the total
computation cost of 6Teccm + 10Th + Tsenc + Tsdec ≈ 0.117.
2) Communication cost: Assume that the number of
bits used to represent identity, timestamp, location and
hash output as 160, 32, 32 and 160 respectively. In
the RGA authentication process, the exchanged mes-
sages in bits are (V Idi, Loci), (R1, TSj), (Ai, R2, TSi)
and (Aj , TSj , enc(GIdj , d1, tn)), which needs (160+32)
= 192, (320+32) = 352, (160+320+32) = 512 and
(160+32+128+128+128) = 576 respectively. The total commu-
nication cost of RGA authentication process is 1632 bits. Table
II presents the comparative overhead analysis with the existing
authentication process, which makes use of ECC [1], [19], and
bilinear pairing [9], [18] as a security mechanism in VANET.
From Table II, it is inferred that the RGA scheme requires a bit
more computational and communication overhead compared
with [19] but achieves significant security features, which best
suits the dynamic VANET environment.
C. Security and Privacy analysis of p-CIDS
Logistic regression in ML is used to predict the probability
of the occurrence of an event by fitting a logistic function. For
the SPCL, we assume a binary logistic regression, where the
output variable is one of two possible classes 0,1. The Logistic
regression algorithm aims to find the optimal parameters by

















Fig. 3. Error Vs Number of Iterations in CIDS
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Fig. 4. Privacy Parameter Vs Accuracy of CL in CIDS
minimizing a loss function. The loss function J(θ) of the












The p-CIDS is simulated with a penalty parameter (τ ) to
0.1. The parameter for regularization is selected as 10−6 with
standard 10-cross validation. The simulation uses the empirical
risk function of logistic regression. As Fig. 3 shows, in SPCL
methodology, the empirical risk is close to the non-private
CL technique and performs much better than the differentially
private CL as well. As shown in Fig. 4, with increasing privacy
parameter ε, the accuracy also increases. But as the accuracy
increases, it is statistically easier to infer the data from the
intermediate states shared among the vehicles. With decreasing
ε, the noise in the results increases, which results in increased
security but potentially degrades the utility of the model. Thus
there should be a balance between the security and accuracy
of the model, which is achieved through the ε parameter.
Therefore, the privacy parameter for SPCL learning, ε is set as
1. The p-CIDS is evaluated using the metrics: precision, recall,
F1-score, and cross-validation score. The detection accuracy
of the p-CIDS system is at 96.81% as seen in Fig. 5, and
it also summarizes the evaluation scores of various learning
models.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the proposed SDVN framework, the security of the
VANET achieves energy efficiency towards green IIoT using
8
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Fig. 5. Evaluation of Collaborative Learning Models
two strategic levels. In the first level, pre-trusted RSUs provide
an RGA authentication mechanism to the vehicles in the
VANET. The RGA schemes reduce the network overhead
with increased security by preventing several attacks. The
vehicle enters into the VANET by receiving a group id-key pair
through RGA authentication. But, some semi-honest vehicles
provide misinformation or drop the packets, such vehicles
become a network threat. The SPCL based p-CIDS is used to
identify these semi-honest vehicles in the network and report
to CA via RSU. In effect, the CA will remove the vehicle from
the green IIoT network, and revocation is achieved using the
RGA group key update process.
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